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The decision to internalize corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities, to buy (outsource) them in the form of corporate 
philanthropy, or to collaborate with other organizations is of great 
significance to the ability of the firm to reap benefits from such activity. 
Using insights provided by organizational economics and the resource-
based view of the firm, this article describes how CSR centrality affects 
governance choice. This framework is tested using data collected from 
Central America. The findings suggest that the higher the centrality of 
CSR activities to the firms’ mission, the more likely that the firms will 
engage in CSR internally. The article discusses directions for fur- ther 
research and concludes with the managerial implications of this 
research. 
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Managers face a varied and increasing demand for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) from stakeholders (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001). 
This demand has been marked by numerous claims linking CSR to 
firm financial performance, in particular in professional publications 
(Kanter, 
1999), in the media, and by emerging international CSR organizations 
such as the United Nations Global Compact. The motivation is 
laudable: If a positive CSR–financial performance relationship can be 
demonstrated, then firms will be motivated to increase spending on 
CSR activities. However, academic research to date has been 
inconclusive, finding positive, negative, and curvilinear relationships 
between CSR and financial performance (Margolis & Walsh, 2001; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, 
& Rynes, 2003). 
Nonetheless, as business firms perceive growing CSR pressure and 
CSR reputation risk (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), commitment to CSR 
initiatives and spending has increased dramatically (Cabrera, Angel, 
& Sánchez, 
 2003). As a result, despite the lack of conclusive evidence 
demonstrating that CSR is a competitive issue, we find a concomitant 
demand for the strategic management of CSR activities and assets 
(Porter & Kramer, 2002). 
How, then, ought firms to respond to the demand for CSR 
management initiatives? The obvious and immediate answer that 
comes to mind is, “the same way firms manage other activities.” 
Taking this quite general and straightforward normative statement on 
firm decision making as our starting point, we now must evaluate 
whether this simple formula is adequate in the case of CSR. For in 
developing a theory of strategic CSR decision making, we face an 
additional difficulty not confronted when dealing with the firm’s market 
strategies. CSR has been defined as “actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is 
required by law” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001, p. 117). In effect, 
strategic decision making in the CSR context requires fulfilling a 
nonmarket requirement generally excluded from strategic 
management theory. At the same time, we would argue that this 
requirement, however, must not preclude the incorporation of CSR into 
the mainstream of strategic management and the theory of the firm. In 
other words, our goal is to develop a theory of CSR decision making 
that does not contravene the basic tenets of the classical theory of the 
firm. 
Perhaps, an analogy from another field rather far from management 
can help to point out the importance of what is at stake. Pascal (1950), 
the French philosopher and mathematician, taught that a faith that 
contradicts reason cannot be believed. In his analysis of faith, Pascal 
understood quite clearly that no system of belief would survive for 
long if it went against the most fundamental principle of human 
thought, namely, reason. In the same way, no theory of CSR decision 
making will endure if it contradicts the most fundamental principle of the 
business firm—the creation of wealth— however beneficial the results 
of CSR for certain stakeholder groups. We cannot forget that the firm, 
as a legal entity, owes its current form and function to its socially agreed-
on role as a producer of wealth (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Should 
we decide to change this role, we would need to reconstitute the firm, 
instituting new forms of governance—in effect, creating a new kind of 
organization. 
Those who defend “the objective function of the firm” have argued that 
CSR must not be antithetical to profit (Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004) and that stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and CSR 
simply replace the fiduciary obligation of firms to investors with the 
laudable desire to do good without specifying how such actions 
actually contribute more to society or improve firm performance. We 
understand their concerns; moreover, we believe that the challenge 
 raised by stakeholder management and CSR is an opportunity to 
enrich the field of strategic management. To do so, however, requires 
putting CSR to the tests set out by the classical theory of the firm. It is 
a test of CSR’s economic efficiency and coherence with firm market 
strategies. It is the same test that, more than 60 years ago, Simon 
(1945) called for when he asked that administrative theory demon- 
strate itself to be consistent with economic theory. A theory of CSR 
strate- gic decision making ought to set out the extent to which CSR 
decisions are similar to or different from other firm decisions. To the 
extent that CSR decision making is different, it would be necessary as 
well to explain how such differences may aid or harm the meeting of 
firm economic objectives. 
Accordingly, we have chosen to consider corporate experience in 
under- taking CSR activity and contribute to advance our 
understanding of CSR in a way that is consistent with current thinking 
in organizational economics (Coase, 1937), including work within 
both agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and transaction-cost 
economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991), as well as the resourced-
based view of the firm (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). This approach 
is consistent with recent research in which market, governance, and 
resource-based analyses are treated as complementary (Hoopes, 
Madsen, & Walker, 2003). 
Specifically, in this article, we consider one of the principal issues in 
the theory of the firm: the make-or-buy decision. Our objective is to 
provide a conceptual framework of the firm’s decision to undertake 
CSR activities internally, to collaborate, or to outsource them to other 
organizations to see whether this is consistent with firm economic 
objectives. We then test this theory using evidence collected from 
firms in Central America. 
Our choice to look at the make-or-buy decision in building a theory of 
the firm that incorporates CSR decision making is based on the 
central role the question has taken on in contemporary theory of the 
firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). The raison d’etre of the firm is 
predicated on answering this very question: Why firms instead of 
markets? Once again, the economic theory of the firm provides a 
straightforward answer consistent with the objective function of the 
firm: efficiency. Firms are more efficient than markets in organizing 
some economic activities. Individual firms, as independent economic 
actors, must also decide which activities they do more efficiently (i.e., 
more profitably) and incorporate those and only those within the firm 
and leave the rest to markets. In principle, a firm will either “buy” CSR 
via outsourcing through the funding of nongovernmental and other 
not-for- profit organizations, “make” CSR internally through the 
development of in- house projects, or collaborate with other 
organizations in the development of CSR projects. The objective of 
 management is to determine which kind of response is most likely to 
benefit the firm in two ways: satisfy the firm’s return on investment 
and satisfy stakeholder demands. To the extent that these two 
objectives conflict, firms will be unable to meet their fundamental 
obligations. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the first section, we 
describe the possible forms of institutional governance for carrying 
out CSR. Using the concept of centrality, we then build a conceptual 
frame- work to explain the conditions under which each kind of CSR 
governance is most appropriate. Using data collected from a survey in 
Central America, we test the theoretical propositions. Finally, we 
develop some of the implications for management and research. 
 
 
Toward a Conceptual Framework of the CSR Make-
Buy-or-Collaborate Decision 
 
A Comparison of CSR Governance 
 
Although there is a variety of forms of institutional governance for 
CSR activities, three patterns occur repeatedly: Firms tend to 
outsource CSR through corporate philanthropy, internalize it through 
direct projects, or use some collaborative form (Husted, 2003). To 
compare the advantages and disadvantages of each form of 
governance, we will distinguish them along four dimensions of 
governance: autonomous adaptation, cooperative adaptation, 
incentive intensity, and administrative control (Williamson, 1991). 
Autonomous adaptation deals with the capacity of the parties to 
conduct a transaction to individually make changes to unforeseen 
contingencies or disturbances. Cooperative adaptation refers to the 
capacity of the parties to respond to disturbances in a coordinated 
way, either through bargaining or administrative fiat. Incentive 
intensity deals with the extent to which economic incentives vary 
according to performance. Finally, administrative control refers to the 
firm’s systems to monitor and either reward or penalize behavior that 
supports its objectives. Let us compare each of the three kinds of 
CSR governance in terms of these distinguishing attributes. 
Philanthropy or charitable contribution includes donations of money or 
goods to nonprofit organizations that undertake charitable, social, 
educational, community, or scientific work. In the case of philanthropy, 
the participation of the donor in the development of CSR activity is 
minimal. It involves a high capacity for autonomous adaptation to 
unforeseen contingencies because administrative decisions are left to 
the recipient of the donation. On the other hand, cooperative 
adaptation is low. If the donor dis- agrees with the response of the 
 recipient to unanticipated contingencies, the donor’s only recourse is 
to withhold future funding from the recipient. Incentive intensity is high 
given the ability of the donor to condition future donations on the 
recipient’s performance and the competition among potential 
recipients for such donations. But administrative controls over the 
recipient’s managers are minimal because of the donor’s inability to 
monitor and either reward or punish the recipient’s managers. 
CSR activities can go beyond philanthropy to the actual development 
and management of specific projects. Direct projects internalize CSR, 
as they require corporate involvement that may include participation in 
the planning, execution, and evaluation of social projects, either alone 
or in collaboration with other organizations. Internal projects are 
developed within the hierarchical structure of the firm and are thus 
subject to all of the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1991). Cooperative adaptation within the firm is high 
because the recipient is a unit within the firm that submits to the same 
authority structure. However, autonomous adaptation is low. Incentive 
intensity is weak given the fact that employees responsible for CSR 
activity usually receive a fixed salary and the success or failure of a 
CSR project does not directly affect their economic incentives. Low 
incentive intensity is compensated with high administrative control as 
internal firm systems provide for surveillance. These systems also 
reward or punish employees in terms of their potential for career 
advancement. 
There are a number of hybrid forms of CSR involving collaborations 
or alliances between the firm and other institutions (Mullen, 1997). 
Such collaboration may go beyond the mere contribution of financial 
resources to the actual design and even joint management of the 
projects in question. For example, Benetton frequently works with 
international humanitarian associations to collect used clothing at its 
stores, which is then distributed by the partner to the needy in the 
Third World. 
Collaborative forms of CSR governance are characterized by 
intermediate levels of the four governance attributes. Incentive 
intensity is greater for a hybrid structure than for a direct project but 
weaker than in the case of philanthropic contributions, given the fact 
that the alliance between the two organizations requires them to work 
out disagreements, rather than simply switch CSR partners. As a 
result of the bilateral dependence that is created between the two 
organizations, adaptation can neither be entirely autonomous nor based 
on administrative fiat. However, cooperative adaptation in the form of 
bargaining is possible. Administrative controls exist but are effective 
only through negotiation between the two organizations. 
In summary, CSR activities can be carried out as corporate 
philanthropy through third parties (nongovernmental organizations, 
 etc.), internally as social projects of the firm, or through hybrid forms 
of collaboration and alliances. Each form displays different strengths 
and weaknesses with respect to its capacity for autonomous 
adaptation, cooperative adaptation, incentive intensity, and 
administrative control. 
 
 
Make, Buy, or Collaborate? 
 
The extent to which CSR will be used to pursue strategic 
opportunities is a basic decision made by management. Where 
strategic concerns are weak, CSR activity may be a reflection of 
pressures to imitate other companies as a way to achieve 
legitimacy (Hoffman, 1999; King & Lenox, 2000; Rivera, 2004; 
Rivera & de Leon 2004). If the firm gives CSR a strategic role, then 
the centrality of CSR to the firm’s business mission appears to be a 
key variable in understanding when the firm internalizes or out- 
sources CSR. Centrality refers to the closeness of fit between the 
firm’s CSR activity and its mission and objectives (Burke & Logsdon, 
1996). Centrality is high when the firm’s CSR activity is closely related 
to the firm’s core business activity. Conversely, centrality is low when 
CSR is unrelated to the core business. 
Centrality is relevant to the internalization decision for two reasons. 
First, centrality has a significant relationship to the agency problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To the extent that CSR activities are 
closely related to the firm’s mission and objectives, the principal-agent 
problem is attenuated because the firm has a greater capacity to 
monitor social activities related to its core competencies. Where 
centrality is low, agency costs increase, thus making the option of 
buying CSR through charitable contributions to an external 
organization more efficient. Second, the concept of centrality relates 
CSR activity to firm resources and core competences. Core 
competences integrate firm-specific assets or resources that allow it 
to engage in distinct activities that are related to its fundamental 
business (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). A CSR activity is highly 
central when it is based on core competences of the firm. For CSR 
activities that display high levels of centrality, the firm already 
possesses the competences needed to undertake that activity. For 
those CSR activities marked by low levels of centrality, firm 
competences do not match the competences needed to undertake 
the activity. The firm may either acquire needed resources through 
collaboration with a nongovernmental organization that does possess 
them or out- source the activity entirely through philanthropic 
donations (Barney, 1999). For example, J. P. Morgan has developed a 
core competence in the structuring and financing of commercial 
projects, which it often extends to social projects. It thus takes few 
 new resources to engage in the same activities as a form of social 
action. This would not be the case of Levi Strauss when it 
contributes money for AIDS research. This activity is not central to the 
mission, objectives, and core competences of Levi’s. In this case, the 
principal-agent problem can be quite severe due to the condition of 
information asymmetry—one of the parties (the recipient) has more 
knowledge concerning the social problem than does the other (the 
donor)—thus making monitoring impossible. 
Philanthropy tends to occur in areas of social concern that are less 
closely related to the core business mission of the firm. As observed 
in the case of Levi’s, AIDS research is not central to its missions. 
This activity is characterized by information asymmetry, given the fact 
that the donor organization is not an expert in AIDS research. It 
faces a problem of monitoring the recipient of funds because of the 
lack of adequate administrative control. As a consequence, this firm 
becomes involved in unrelated CSR activities through philanthropy. 
From the perspective of the donor, information asymmetry is reduced 
for social issues unrelated to the mission of the firm by outsourcing 
social action to external recipients (nongovernmental organizations) 
that do have the necessary competence and face greater incentive 
intensity through competition for limited corporate funds. 
CSR activities in areas closely related to the core business of the firm 
are usually internalized because of the greater competence of the firm 
and thus the greater ability to monitor recipients through its 
administrative control sys- tem. For example, Benetton is involved in a 
number of publicity campaigns that feature social problems. Its 
“Enemies” campaign featured a clothing catalogue of Jewish and 
Palestinian citizens of Israel with statements by both about their daily 
life together. The catalogue sensitively portrayed the humanity of both 
sides of the conflict. The persons featured in the catalogue were not 
models but regular people, all wearing Benetton clothing. In this case, 
the social campaign blended well with Benetton’s competence in 
marketing. In addition, the firm can evaluate the effectiveness of internal 
social investments, thus reducing the principal–agent problem. 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the centrality of CSR activities to a firm’s mission, 
the more likely that the firm will engage in CSR internally. 
 
Until now, we have been dealing with the conditions that foster two 
polar forms of CSR activity: philanthropy (outsourcing) or internal 
projects. As previously mentioned, there are also important hybrid 
forms, including strategic alliances and other forms of collaboration. 
Collaborations allow the firm to participate in social projects outside 
its core business mission. The firm contributes its resources, such as 
 managerial capacity or the structuring of financial transactions, 
together with other organizations that have greater expertise with a 
given social problem. 
Collaborations allow the firm to leverage its resources to address 
social problems outside the realm of its core business mission. 
Obviously, these projects are less central to the firm’s mission than in 
the cases of internal social projects but, at the same time, are related 
to the firm’s mission because of the particular resources that the firm 
invests. As a result of the contribution of these resources and 
competences, the condition of information asymmetry is attenuated 
without being eliminated entirely. In addition, the hybrid form displays 
a superior capacity for cooperative adaptation than does outsourcing, 
while preserving some capacity for autonomous adaptation not 
available to internal governance. Thus, we argue that hybrid forms 
most likely occur when the firm develops projects characterized by 
inter- mediate levels of centrality. 
 
Proposition 2: At moderate levels of centrality, collaborative forms of CSR 
activity are more likely to occur than either internal projects or external 
contributions. 
 
 
Method 
 
A survey instrument was developed to measure centrality, the 
different options for governance, and a number of control variables. 
The face valid- ity of the instrument was determined by a detailed 
examination of the instrument by 10 academics and business people 
in Mexico and Spain who reviewed the instrument for items that may 
have been unclear. The survey was then distributed to members of 
two continuing education seminars con- ducted by one of the authors 
through the Instituto Centroamericano de Administración de 
Empresas (INCAE), the leading business school in the region and 
one of the leading business schools in Latin America. One hundred 
eighteen responses were gathered, but only 60 (51%) were 
usable. Many of the respondents were from countries outside the 
region of interest. Some responses came from executives of not-for-
profit organizations. Although they have a social orientation, these 
respondent firms do not face the strategic choice that is the focus of 
this study. The convenience sample represented by these data is 
justified given the extremely difficult nature of gathering survey data 
in Central America (Rivera, 2002). Mail and telephone surveys are 
out of the question in the region. 
The average number of employees in the firms represented in the 
sample was 590. Of the final sample, 14 firms were from Costa Rica, 
 7 from Panama, 7 from Nicaragua, 15 from Guatemala, 12 from El 
Salvador, and 5 from Honduras. They represented a variety of 
different industries including food products, cement and construction, 
banking and financial services, communications, and paint 
manufacturing. 
Centrality was determined by asking the extent to which developing 
community projects, protecting the environment, and helping solve 
social problems were important to the firm’s business mission. The 
centrality construct (α = 0.79) demonstrated satisfactory levels of 
reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). With respect to CSR 
governance choice, we asked respondents to indicate the extent to 
which they agreed with statements that their CSR projects were 
organized internally, that their firms participated in partnerships with 
nongovernmental organizations, and that their firms made charitable 
contributions. Firms were classified as being predominantly focused 
on internal projects, collaborative projects, and external or 
philanthropic projects using cluster analysis. 
Construct validity was evaluated by examining the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the measures. Convergent validity was 
assessed looking at the pairwise correlations between the items for 
each construct. All are significant at the p < .01 level, except one that 
was significant at the p < .05 level. Therefore, there is evidence of 
convergent validity for the different measures. 
Discriminant validity was evaluated by performing a factor analysis on 
the items included in the survey. The items related to centrality and 
governance choice each loaded on a different factor, indicating that 
they did dis- criminate between the variables. 
The hypotheses were tested using both discriminant analysis and 
probit analysis. As suggested by previous studies of determinants of 
CSR (Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; King 
& Lenox, 
2000; Rivera, 2004), in the probit analysis, we included firm size, local 
or foreign ownership, market participation, and internationalization as 
control variables. Firm size was measured by the number of 
employees in the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 
Scores of the Three Clusters on the Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Governance Items With Central American Data 
 Clusters 
Item External 
Contribution 
Collaboration Internal 
Project 
F Sig. 
Programs are carried 
out independently 
1.00 1.67 4.53 55.76 0.00 
Programs are carried 
out in collaboration with 
other organizations 
1.00 4.08 2.88 5.46 0.01 
Programs are carried 
out through donations 
to other organizations 
4.67 2.58 1.88 5.64 0.01 
 
Foreign ownership was determined by asking whether majority 
ownership was in local or foreign hands. Market participation was 
determined by asking the percentage participation of the firm in its 
most important market. Finally, internationalization was discovered by 
asking the percentage of sales in foreign markets. 
 
Results 
 
To test the hypotheses, the first task was to classify the firms 
according to their tendency to undertake CSR internally, 
collaboratively, or externally through donations to nonprofit 
organizations. We performed a hierarchical clustering procedure, 
known as the average linkage within groups approach (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992). We had initially used the single 
linkage procedure, but the cases were placed in a long snakelike 
chain, which made no theoretical sense. Thus, we turned to the 
average linkage procedure. Clusters were developed based on the 
responses to three items concerning the extent to which CSR 
programs are developed independently by the firm, through projects 
developed in collaboration with other organizations, or externally 
through philanthropic donations to other organizations. These three 
items were Likert-type scales. The clustering procedure was carried 
out by specifying that no more than three clusters should be allowed. 
As Table 1 displays, the cluster procedure was formed by three 
different groups, each with a different emphasis on internalization, 
collaboration, and external contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 
Discriminant Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Governance by Central American Firms Using Centrality 
as the Independent Variable 
 
 
Variable 
External 
Contribution 
 
Collaboration 
Internal 
Project 
 
F 
 
Prob. 
Tukey’s HSD 
Resultsa 
Centrality –2.06 –0.33 0.29 8.52 0.00 Collaboration 
> External 
Internal 
> External 
Note: Box’s M = 13.76 (p = .12). 
a. Collaboration > External means that the mean of the variable for the collaboration 
group was significantly greater than the mean of the same variable for the external 
contributions group. 
 
To initially test the hypotheses, we conducted a discriminant analysis 
using the groups identified in the first step as the dependent variable. 
Discriminant analysis assumes that the covariance matrices are 
homogeneous (Klecka, 1980). Box’s M test evaluates the assumption 
of homogeneity of covariance matrices. This test is also very 
sensitive to meeting the assumption of multivariate normality. The test 
is not significant, so we conclude that the groups do not differ in their 
covariance matrices. 
Centrality was the independent variable. Table 2 indicates that 
centrality does significantly discriminate among the different CSR 
governance forms. Internal projects show the highest levels of 
centrality. In addition, the level of centrality is highest for the case of 
internal projects, intermediate for the collaborative case, and lowest 
for the external contributions case. Tukey’s HSD results confirm that 
both internal projects and collaborative projects reflect higher levels 
of centrality than do external contributions. 
A probit model was also used to model the CSR strategy adopted by 
firms (1 = internal; 0 = external CSR: here, the external category 
involves both collaboration and “pure” external approach). The probit 
model allowed us to include control variables. Due to missing values 
for some of the control variables, the sample size was reduced from 
60 for the discriminant analysis to 32 for the probit analysis. The 
results of the probit analysis are shown in Table 3. 
The probit model correctly classifies 91.8% of CSR choices. The chi- 
square likelihood test statistic indicates that the overall model is 
significant at p < .01 (99.9 probability). The probit model findings 
indicate that centrality is positively and significantly associated with 
internal CSR. 
 
 
 Table 3: Probit Analysis 
 
 Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Prob. 
Size 0.0005 0.0005 1.40 0.24 
Nationality of ownership 0.26 0.75 0.12 0.73 
Market share –0.01 0.02 0.71 0.40 
Internationalization –00.04 0.01 5.98 0.01 
Centrality 1.06 0.39 7.49 0.01 
Note: Percentage concordant: 91.8%. Chi-square likelihood ratio = 19.81 (p < .001). 
 
These results provide support for Proposition 1 that the higher the 
centrality of CSR activities to a firm’s mission, the more likely that the 
firm will engage in CSR internally. In addition, the coefficient on the 
firm’s proportion of international business suggests that the lower the 
percentage of international business in a firm, the more likely it is to 
engage in internal CSR. Firm size, nationality, and market share were 
not related to the internalization decision. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results indicate that the variable of centrality plays an important 
role in discriminating among firms that tend to engage in CSR 
internally, collaboratively, and externally. Both the probit analysis and 
discriminant analysis show that the modes of CSR governance occur 
in the order predicted by the theory presented in this article. 
In this article, we outline a theory of the internalization and 
outsourcing of CSR activity. The theory provides managers with 
guidelines for deter- mining whether CSR activities should be 
outsourced, conducted in-house, or managed through some 
collaborative form. Evidence from Central America indicates that 
firms can be distinguished by the CSR governance forms they 
choose. It also indicates that these governance forms are associated 
with different levels of centrality. These results imply that mismatches 
may occur between a specific project and the CSR governance form 
chosen. By identifying a variable relevant to this decision, this article 
provides management with the means to reduce the possibility of 
such mismatches. These findings should thus reduce the costs 
associated with CSR projects and increase their benefits so that other 
firms may be motivated to give CSR their proper role in their own 
strategic planning. 
In addition to these practical management concerns, the article 
suggests several important issues concerning the theory of the firm 
as well as avenues for further research. As we argued in our 
introduction, the debate over CSR within strategic management has 
 taken two diametrically opposed routes. On one hand, supporters of 
CSR have argued that the classical economic theory misconstrues 
the objective of the firm by too narrowly defining what firms actually 
do (Freeman & McVea, 2001); on the other hand, supporters of 
shareholder value argue that maximizing profit is the only coherent 
approach to evaluate what firms do and that, hence, it ought to be the 
only objective of the firm. In this article, we examine the extent to 
which these two approaches can be reconciled by exploring one of the 
basic questions of the theory of the firm and putting CSR to the test in 
a way that is consistent with organizational economics and the 
resource-based view of the firm. 
Our finding, that centrality does in fact affect CSR decision making, 
suggests that CSR is compatible with the classical theory of the firm. 
We are aware that the study has important limitations and that these 
findings are just a first step. Our sample is small and restricted to a 
specific geographic area that is customarily not available for study, 
limiting the kinds of comparisons that can be made. It is clear that 
these findings are suggestive, not conclusive. Nevertheless, it might 
be argued that finding a relationship between centrality and 
internalization in Central America, an area not known for 
sophisticated CSR management, despite the difficulties in con- 
ducting research and, hence, problems of generalizability, is 
especially exciting for scholars interested in studying the extent to 
which CSR can be integrated into firm strategic management 
globally. 
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